Papers and Publications
| Title | Date Published | Link | Abstract |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hubris, Hypocrisy or Hedge - Seventy Six Words - UK Nuclear Policy Shifts in the Integrated Review | 1 April 2021 | Hubris, Hypocrisy or Hedge | Published by BASIC, the paper analyses the nuclear policy shifts in the UK's Integrated Review of March 2021, and makes suggestions for the UK to recover lost prestige and ground from the announcements, and divert from its most destabilising conclusions. |
| UK Nuclear Deterrence If the Union Fails | 1 April 2021 | UK Nuclear Deterrence If the Union Fails | Published by the European Leadership Network (ELN), the paper examines the serious implications for the UK's deterrent in the event of Scottish secession and suggests NATO and UK Govt make very clear in advance the repercussions in the UK and for a newly independent Scotland |
| IMPROVING NUCLEAR STRATEGIC STABILITY THROUGH A RESPONSIBILITY-BASED APPROACH :A Platform For 21st Century Arms Control | 25 October 2019 | JG Nuc Responsibility Paper Oct 2019 | This is an update of the paper published on 7 January, for a presentation at the UN on 25 Oct 19. It brings together several critical elements and key tenets of nuclear weapons policies and postures. There is an urgent need to find mechanisms that would help turn the world’s nuclear weapons capable states from their current increasingly perilous track and provide an incentive for countries to resume discussions on shared security interests. A vital contribution would be for states to agree a globally-shared definition of Nuclear Strategic Stability (suggested in this paper) that accounts for the complexities of the world today. An equally immediate agreement and adoption of a Code of Responsibility (proposed in this paper) would foster a responsibility-based approach. These elements, as outlined above, provide the more stable platform necessary for agreement on a logical sequence of phases that would help nuclear weapons capable states maintain stable deterrence while pursuing new concepts for arms control and reductions that could re-energise the spirit and the grand bargain of the NPT. Such a drive for stability and progress is urgently required to reverse the current hazardous trajectory. |
| UK NC3 Podcast | 12 September 2019 | Tech4GS NC3 Systems Papers and Podcasts | Navigate to the Fourth Leg Podcast; John Gower UK NC3 |
| United Kingdom NC3 | 12 September 2019 | Tech4GS: UK NC3; John Gower(PDF) | PDF Copy of joint paper |
| UNITED KINGDOM: NUCLEAR WEAPON COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS | 12 September 2019 | Nautilus Org: UK NC3; John Gower | In this essay, I outline that the UK Nuclear Weapon Command Control and Communications (UK NC3) architecture is designed and operated to support SSBN strategic nuclear deterrence in all foreseeable circumstances from peacetime to nuclear conflict. “Through multiple paths and frequencies, fall-back and alternative systems and with dedicated and unique encryption and processes it delivers continuous availability for the Prime Minister should a decision to launch be made.” |
| IMPROVING NUCLEAR STRATEGIC STABILITY THROUGH A RESPONSIBILITY-BASED APPROACH :A Platform For 21st Century Arms Control | 7 January 2019 | Council on Strategic Risks Paper | This brief paper brings together several critical elements and key tenets of nuclear weapons policies and postures. There is an urgent need to find mechanisms that would help turn the world’s nuclear weapons capable states from their current increasingly perilous track and provide an incentive for countries to resume discussions on shared security interests. A vital contribution would be for states to agree a globally-shared definition of Nuclear Strategic Stability (suggested in this paper) that accounts for the complexities of the world today. An equally immediate agreement and adoption of a Code of Responsibility (proposed in this paper) would foster a responsibility-based approach. These elements, as outlined above, provide the more stable platform necessary for agreement on a logical sequence of phases that would help nuclear weapons capable states maintain stable deterrence while pursuing new concepts for arms control and reductions that could re-energise the spirit and the grand bargain of the NPT. Such a drive for stability and progress is urgently required to reverse the current hazardous trajectory. |
| Nuclear Signalling Between NATO and Russia - a paper for the ELN | 12 October 2018 | European Leadership Network Paper | Nuclear signalling is the core of responsible nuclear weapon ownership. It much more complex than even the Cold War. A rapidly evolving information and communications paradigm that is outstripping the ability of traditional signalling to achieve coherence and stability has added to this challenge. This report examines the current doctrine and signalling of all the protagonists and concludes that the risks of misperception or unwanted escalation are higher than they have been for several decades and are rising. Proactive effort is required to reverse this. NWS on either side of the NATO-Russian borders must carefully examine signalling options that can increase stability and reduce the risk of miscalculation. While action is required by all relevant states, the author has drawn on his NATO and UK experience to offer some recommended actions for both these actors. |
| The Dangerous Illogic of Twenty-First-Century Deterrence Through Planning for Nuclear Warfighting | 6 March 2018 | Carnegie Article | Rather than use Cold War principles, nuclear states should shift their nuclear doctrines and capabilities to strategic deterrence as needed by the twenty-first century |
| Contributor to IISS Military Balance 2017 | 14 February 2017 | Access via the IISS Webpage (subscription required) | |
| Nuclear Cruise Missiles: Remarks at a UN 1st Committee side event | 13 October 2016 | Published Files | At the invitation of the Swiss and Swedish governments, remarks made in panel regarding nuclear armed cruise missiles at the UN HQ on 13 Oct 16 |
| TRIDENT - A necessary Deterrent | 1 September 2016 | This article is only available through the magazine Warship World and is contained in Vol 15 No 1 | A rebuttal of many myths about Trident and why its cancellation would neither improve security for the UK or her Allies nor channel the funds into the conventional Royal Navy |
| Successor SSBN: a Necessary Strategic Decision for the UK Parliament | 11 July 2016 | European Leadership Network - SSBN Vote Paper | With the Successor SSBN vote set for 18 Jul 16 this argues why Parliament should vote for a 4 SSBN programme |
| Concerning SSBN Vulnerability - recent papers | 10 June 2016 | BASIC Blog - SSBN Vulnerability | Responds to assertions and speculation in two papers published by BASIC about threats to SSBN security from cyber attack and UUVs |
| The UK and Nuclear Weapons - The Necessity for a Strategic View | 20 November 2015 | Carnegie Paper | Discusses the Corbyn agenda, examines the continuing need for deterrence within a fresh coherent strategy for non-proliferation and omnilateral disarmament |
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