Papers and Publications
| Title | Date Published | Link | Abstract |
|---|---|---|---|
| IMPROVING NUCLEAR STRATEGIC STABILITY THROUGH A RESPONSIBILITY-BASED APPROACH :A Platform For 21st Century Arms Control | 7 January 2019 | Council on Strategic Risks Paper | This brief paper brings together several critical elements and key tenets of nuclear weapons policies and postures. There is an urgent need to find mechanisms that would help turn the world’s nuclear weapons capable states from their current increasingly perilous track and provide an incentive for countries to resume discussions on shared security interests. A vital contribution would be for states to agree a globally-shared definition of Nuclear Strategic Stability (suggested in this paper) that accounts for the complexities of the world today. An equally immediate agreement and adoption of a Code of Responsibility (proposed in this paper) would foster a responsibility-based approach. These elements, as outlined above, provide the more stable platform necessary for agreement on a logical sequence of phases that would help nuclear weapons capable states maintain stable deterrence while pursuing new concepts for arms control and reductions that could re-energise the spirit and the grand bargain of the NPT. Such a drive for stability and progress is urgently required to reverse the current hazardous trajectory. |
| Nuclear Signalling Between NATO and Russia - a paper for the ELN | 12 October 2018 | European Leadership Network Paper | Nuclear signalling is the core of responsible nuclear weapon ownership. It much more complex than even the Cold War. A rapidly evolving information and communications paradigm that is outstripping the ability of traditional signalling to achieve coherence and stability has added to this challenge. This report examines the current doctrine and signalling of all the protagonists and concludes that the risks of misperception or unwanted escalation are higher than they have been for several decades and are rising. Proactive effort is required to reverse this. NWS on either side of the NATO-Russian borders must carefully examine signalling options that can increase stability and reduce the risk of miscalculation. While action is required by all relevant states, the author has drawn on his NATO and UK experience to offer some recommended actions for both these actors. |
| The Dangerous Illogic of Twenty-First-Century Deterrence Through Planning for Nuclear Warfighting | 6 March 2018 | Carnegie Article | Rather than use Cold War principles, nuclear states should shift their nuclear doctrines and capabilities to strategic deterrence as needed by the twenty-first century |
| Contributor to IISS Military Balance 2017 | 14 February 2017 | Access via the IISS Webpage (subscription required) | |
| Nuclear Cruise Missiles: Remarks at a UN 1st Committee side event | 13 October 2016 | Published Files | At the invitation of the Swiss and Swedish governments, remarks made in panel regarding nuclear armed cruise missiles at the UN HQ on 13 Oct 16 |
| TRIDENT - A necessary Deterrent | 1 September 2016 | This article is only available through the magazine Warship World and is contained in Vol 15 No 1 | A rebuttal of many myths about Trident and why its cancellation would neither improve security for the UK or her Allies nor channel the funds into the conventional Royal Navy |
| Successor SSBN: a Necessary Strategic Decision for the UK Parliament | 11 July 2016 | European Leadership Network - SSBN Vote Paper | With the Successor SSBN vote set for 18 Jul 16 this argues why Parliament should vote for a 4 SSBN programme |
| Concerning SSBN Vulnerability - recent papers | 10 June 2016 | BASIC Blog - SSBN Vulnerability | Responds to assertions and speculation in two papers published by BASIC about threats to SSBN security from cyber attack and UUVs |
| The UK and Nuclear Weapons - The Necessity for a Strategic View | 20 November 2015 | Carnegie Paper | Discusses the Corbyn agenda, examines the continuing need for deterrence within a fresh coherent strategy for non-proliferation and omnilateral disarmament |
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